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THE PRECEDENT VALUE OF
CONCLUSIONS OF FACT IN CIVIL CASES
IN ENGLAND AND LOUISIANA
David W. Robertson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional distinction between a question of law and a
question of fact is easy to state: "A question of identifying
broadly formulated principles for judging the parties' conduct
can meaningfully be defined as a question of law; a question
of reconstructing acts or events which have actually taken place,
or conditions which have actually existed, can meaningfully be
defined as a question of fact."'- Obviously, there is a lot in the
middle. Analytically it is impossible to classify the task of
characterizing acts or events or conditions, of applying the gen-
eral to the specific, as either a law question or a fact question;
it is neither, or it is both. Thus, that defendant owes plaintiff
a duty of reasonable care is a proposition of law; that events
and conditions A through X existed is a proposition of fact;
whether these events and conditions amounted to a breach of the
duty of reasonable care is a mixed question.
Where juries are employed in civil cases, classifying such
a mixed question as a question of law or as a question of fact
is determinative of the allocation of decision on that question
to judge or jury. Because it is not analytically soluble, the char-
acterization should be done on the basis of a policy determination
that the judge or jury is the preferable decision maker. Under
a traditional jury system, such characterization was purposive
in this sense, albeit in a rough-and-ready way. Speaking of the
situation in England before the decline of the civil jury, Lord
Somervell summarized the matter thusly:
"Whether a duty of reasonable care is owed by A to B is a
question of law. In a special relationship, such as that of
employer to employee, the law may go further and define
the heads and scope of the duty. When negligence cases were
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Texas. LL.B. 1961, Louisiana
State University. The assistance of C. Morris Davis and Robert Hasty is grate-
fully acknowledged.
1. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF.
L. REv. 1020 (1967) See also Weiner, The Civil Jur, Trial and the Law-Fact
Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. Rv. 1867 (1966).
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tried with juries the judge would direct them as to the law.
The question whether on the facts in that particular case
there was or was not a duty to take reasonable care was a
question for the jury. There was not, and could not be,
complete uniformity of standard. One jury would attribute
to the reasonable man a greater degree of prescience than
would another."' 2
Where civil trial is to a judge alone, it is still easier for the
law-fact distinction to become muddy. For one thing, the distinc-
tion has lost its importance as a device for allocating the judge-
jury burden, so that there is likely to be less attention paid to
it. For another, "a judge naturally gives reasons for the con-
clusions formerly arrived at by a jury without reasons."'3 But
the distinction is still just as important, because it greatly af-
fects the appellate courts' approach to the case. In most jurisdic-
tions, the trial judge's answers to questions of law are freely
reviewable, while his answers to questions of fact are entitled
to special weight on appeal. Here, as with respect to the judge-
jury allocation at the instance level, characterization of a par-
ticular proposition as one of law or one of fact ought to be
purposive. For example, whether to accord special weight to a
trial judge's conclusion that conduct X amounted to negligent
conduct cannot reasonably depend upon any analytical determina-
tion that the proposition is either legal or factual. It ought, there-
fore, to depend on a policy determination as to the relative
strengths and weaknesses of trial and appellate judges. Part of
that policy determination should take into account the fact that
any proposition enunciated by an appellate court is susceptible
of being treated as precedent for future cases. Lord Somervell
pointed the danger for England: "It may sometimes be difficult
to draw the line, but if the reasons given by a judge for ar-
riving at the conclusion previously reached by a jury are to be
treated as 'law' and citable, the precedent system will die from
a surfeit of authorities." 4
There has been some indication of concern that in the United
States generally, predominantly sticking to the civil jury system,
the precedent system is nevertheless dying of a "surfeit of au-
thorities." Professor Grant Gilmore has written that we in
America have come to use our case law in a manner that shocks,
for example, the English observer. The trouble is that our case-
2. Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, [1959) A.C. 759, 767.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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law system has been breaking down of its own weight. "The
theory of precedent depends, for its ideal operation, on the
existence of a comfortable number of precedents, but not too
many. There must be a substantial accumulation of the wisdom
of the past before the courts can begin drawing on it for the
construction of the bridge along which we move toward the fu-
ture. But when the store of raw materials becomes too great, too
varied, too confused, the bridge-building process turns into a
random operation. When it becomes possible to cite to a court
not merely two or three prior cases which bear a reasonable
relationship to this case, but dozens of cases, many of them so
nearly identical on their facts as to be indistinguishable, decided
every which way-then what is the court to do? ' 5 The English
have not yet progressed so far. They have a single system of
courts, they do not report all of their appellate decisions, 6 and
they seem to be less litigious than we are. The result is that
"the case on all fours-the case whose facts are indistinguishable
from the facts of the case at bar-far from offering itself in
a drift of carbons as it does with us, hardly exists at all."'7
So, the English tend to use prior cases for their general prin-
ciples and process of reasoning, and they end up-under their
formal notions about stare decisis-with a system of precedent
that is in fact more flexible than it tends to be in the United
States.
Part of Professor Gilmore's problem probably does not exist
in Louisiana. Whatever one thinks about the over-all merits of
our civilian tradition, it has given us a certain insularity in
matters of private law from the cases decided in the other forty-
nine states. Any "drift of carbons" that confronted a Louisiana
judge would be quite likely to be entirely home-produced. But
in Louisiana, as in England, the civil jury is employed relatively
infrequently.8 In both jurisdictions this has led to concern at
the appellate level about the content of the law-fact distinction.
In both, there has arisen the danger of creating a body of pre-
cedent on propositions that would elsewhere amount to un-
5. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041
(1967).
6. For percentages of reported cases for the various English courts, see
Karlen, The Court of Appeal in England, 72 YALE L.J. 266, 274-75 (1962).
7. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041
(1967).
8. In England about two to three percent of the civil cases tried in common
law courts involve a jury. See DEvLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 132 (Hamlyn Lecture, 8th
series, 1956) ; Ward v. James, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 455, 462. The percentage in Lou-
isiana is roughly comparable. See Sarpy, Civil Juries, Their Decline and Eventual
Fall, 11 LOYOLA L. REv. 243 (1962-63).
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reviewable jury determinations. In England, there has been
specific concern about this danger. While there has been scant
discussion of the subject in the Louisiana legal literature, study
of the jurisprudence reveals that appellate rulings on questions
that under a jury system would be termed fact questions have
to a significant extent come to be citable as precedent. There-
fore, the English reluctance to generate a multiplicity of pre-
cedents could well be relevant to Louisiana lawyers, as the fol-
lowing discussion will seek to demonstrate.
II. THE CIVIL NONJURY TRIAL
A. England
Up to 1854, all civil cases in English common law courts were
tried by a judge sitting with a jury; no other mode of trial was
available. In that year the Common Law Procedure Act 9 took
the first step in what proved to be the near-abolition of the civil
jury. Section 1 of that statute provided that "the parties to any
cause may, by consent in writing, leave the decision of any
issue of fact to the court, provided that the court think fit to
allow such trial; and such issue of fact may thereupon be tried
and determined, and damages assessed where necessary by any
judge who might otherwise have presided at the trial thereof
by jury."'1 In 1883 a further significant alteration in practice
occurred. The rules of the supreme court were amended to set
aside for special treatment six categories of cases: libel, slander,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, and breach
of promise of marriage. In those cases jury trial continued to
be available as a matter of course; in all others, there had to be
a special request for jury trial. The structure of the rule was
such as to convey the clear impression that trial by judge alone
was regarded as the usual thing, trial by jury exceptional.
World War I speeded the decline of the civil jury. Toward the
end of that war, in response to the fact that jurors were no
longer easily available, the Juries Act, 1918, was enacted. Sec-
tion 1 provided that in the six classes of cases enumerated
above, and in cases of fraud, there existed a right to a jury
trial. In all other cases, whether to grant a trial by jury was at
the discretion of the trial judge. The Juries Act was emergency
9. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125.
10. The act also empowered the judge, on his own motion, to transmit matters
of account to a referee. The Judicature Act, 1873, took matters a step further.
Section 57 extended the matters transferable to a referee to include "matters re-
quiring prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local
investigation."
82 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
legislation and expired six months after the end of the war. It
was speedily replaced by a permanent piece of legislation, the
Administration of Justice Act, 1920. But there was enough ob-
jection to the permanent continuation of the restrictions on
jury trial to lead Parliament, in the Supreme Court of Judicature
(Consolidation) Act, 1925, to restore matters to their pre-1918
situation.
But the trend seemed irresistible. In 1933 Parliament enacted
the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,
which is the governing legislation today. This Act was in sub-
stance the same as the 1920 statute, altering it only to limit
the right to a jury in fraud cases to the party against whom
fraud is alleged.
Thus, the present position is that in cases of fraud, the party
charged has a right to a jury trial. In cases of false imprison-
ment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, seduction, and breach
of promise of marriage, either party may demand a jury trial.
In all other cases :the use of a jury is entirely within the court's
discretion. In only two to three percent of the civil cases tried
is a jury currently employed. About half of this percentage is
made up of those cases as to which there is a right to jury trial.
The other half of the two to three percent constitutes the cases
in which a trial judge's discretion has been exercised in favor
of trial by jury."
A major reason for the infrequent use of the civil jury is
that it is seldom requested. Apparently solicitors tend to advise
their clients to avoid the jury, on the theory that with a judge,
one is more likely to know where he stands, and that judicial
errors are far more susceptible of appellate correction than are
jury mistakes. One consequence of the infrequency of requests
for juries is that judges, at least initially, are suspicious of such
requests when they do occur. The initial presupposition is prob-
ably that the party seeking a jury has a weak case, or that he
desires to pursue an illegitimate appeal to lay sympathy. Thus,
11. The 1933 statute received its first important judicial consideration in
1937 in Hope v. Great Western Ry. Co. [1937] 2 K.B. 130. A full Court of
Appeal in that case went into the question of the extent and manner of exercise
of the trial court's discretion on a request for a jury. Some of the language of
Lord Wright, M.R., in that case was misunderstood, and the case came to stand
for the proposition that the trial judge's decision on a jury request-was un-
reviewable. The matter'was put right in Ward v. James, [1965] 1 All E.R. 563, and
the present position appears to be that, while great weight will attach to the
trial judge's determination, the appellate court will reverse when convinced that
he was wrong.
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one consequence of the relative rarity of, jury trial is that it
becomes steadily more rare-the trend is self-nourishing, partly
because lawyers, by and large, prefer to stay by familiar prac-
tices and procedures, to avoid the unusual. 2
B. Louisiana
In Louisiana, as well, the civil jury trial is a relatively rare
phenomenon. The state's procedural codes since 1805 have pro-
vided for a right to trial by jury in civil cases. But the right
is rather seriously limited in the current Code of Civil Pro-
cedure,3 and it is seldom exercised.1' The reasons are not far
to seek. The Louisiana Constitution provides that appeals in civil
cases shall lie as to both law and fact.15 These provisions, result-
ing from Louisiana's history as a civilian jurisdiction,"5 are
generally credited with discouraging exercise of the right to a
jury by parties to civil litigation..7 The theory has it that, gen-
erally speaking, a civil jury would be desired because of its
greater susceptibility to an emotional appeal on the issue of
liability, and perhaps because of supposed greater liberality
on issues of quantum. But under a system of appellate fact re-
view, any irrational jury determinations would be overruled.
Thus juries are avoided in deference to predictability and to
the judge's greater experience and training in decision making.
It is possible that this theory has put the matter too broadly.
The civil jury is not indigenous to civilian law. Civil jury trial
was not introduced in Louisiana until the Practice Act of 1805,
when the common law system of the territory's new owner
began to have an impact on the local civil law. Apparently the
12. See DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 133 (Hamlyn Lecture, 8th series, 1956).
13. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1731, 1733; see Hubert, Trial by Jury under the
New Code of Civil Procedure, 35 TUL. L. Ray. 520 (1961).
14. See Sarpy, Civil Juries, Their Decline and Eventual Fall, 11 LoYoLA L.
Ray. 24 (1962-63).
15. Both the intermediate appellate courts and the State Supreme Court are
charged with review of the facts. See LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 29.
16. "The Continental tradition required that the appellate courts could, and'
should, review the determinations of both law and fact made by the trial court.
Within four years after the admission of Louisiana to the federal union, the
supreme court of the new state ruled that appellate courts could review the
evidence taken at the trial and reverse the jury verdict. Abat v. Doliolle, 4 Mart.
(O.S.) 316 (La. 1816). Appellate review of the facts was effectively retained.
The decision, affirmed several times, was finally embodied in the Louisiana Consti-
tution, which, consistently, does not guarantee a trial by jury in civil cases. "
Hubert, Trial By Jury Under the New Code of Civil Procedure, 35 TUL. L. REV.
520 (1961).
17. See Deutsch, Jury Trial Under the Federal Rules and the Louisiana
Practice, 3 LA. L. REv. 422, 426 (1941) ; Hubert, Trial By Jury Under the New
Code of Civil Procedure, 35 Tur. L. Ray. 520, 522 (1961) ; Sarpy, Civil Juries,
Their Decline and Eventual Fall, 11 LOYOLA L. REv. 24 (1962-63).
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use of the jury in civil cases never became widespread after its
introduction. Thus it might be more accurate to state that the
significance of appellate fact review, in light of the state's legal
history, is not that it removed the rationale for using juries, but
that it merely reinforced the inertia of tradition by making
the jury less attractive. This analysis implies that the desirability
of a jury in a given case is largely a matter of intuition, con-
trolled, at least in part, by prejudices transmitted from one gen-
eration of lawyers to another.
The sparing use of the civil jury has been applauded by some
of the commentators as affording the Louisiana litigant a relati-
vely speedy, efficient, and inexpensive trial.' But plaintiffs in
personal injury cases not infrequently demand a jury trial, and
there has been some disposition to question the merits of ap-
pellate fact review in such cases. "Several attempts during the
past two decades have sought unsuccessfully to amend the state
constitution, so as to make jury findings final on the facts. The
contention seems to be that the Louisiana appellate courts are
all too prone to lower the verdict."'19 Furthermore, the point has
sometimes been made that there is considerable continuing
validity to the idea that trial by jury "serves a bulwark against
oppressionby bureaucracy and officialdom,' 0 and that American
adherence to the institution is grounded in an "American re-
pugnance to autocracy." 2 , The absence of the civil jury de-
monstrably robs a legal system of flexibility.22 Part of its
philosophic appeal lies in the seemingly unavoidable difference
between what Pound called "law in books and law in action.' 23
Many scholars have pointed the salutary effects of the possibil-
ity of lay, common sense mitigation of too-rigid legal doctrine.24
III. APPELLATE FACT REVIEW
A. England
Before the Act there were, broadly speaking, two forms of
18. See, e.g., Sarpy, Civil Juries, Their Decline and Eventual Fall, 11
LOYOLA L. RaV. 24 (1962-63).
19. Id. at 254.
20. Summers, Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TUL. L. REV. 3, 7 (1964).
21. Id.
22. See Malone, Damage suits and the Contagious Principles of Workmen's
Compensation, 12 LA. L. REV. 231, 236-38 (1952).
23. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REV. 12, 18-21
(1910), quoted in Summers, Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TuL. L. REV.
7 (1964).
24. See generally Summers, Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TUL. L. REV.
7 (1964) ; James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655
(1963) ; Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Cases Where
Juries are Waived, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 218 (1936) ; Wigmore, A Program for the
Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 166 (1929).
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trial in use. In addition to the peculiarly English concept of
trial by jury, there was the sort of trial that took place in
Chancery Court. In Chancery, review of findings of fact was
virtually unlimited. In theory the instance judge sat as the de-
puty of the Lord Chancellor, and all his conclusions were tested
de novo. As the normal Chancery proceeding involved no wit-
nesses, only documentary evidence, all the evidence the instance
judge saw was available in like form to the appellate court.
When the nonjury trial, with witnesses, was introduced on the
common law side, a choice had to be made between two modes of
review-the common law judge could be given "the impregn-
ability of a jury or the vulnerability of a Vice-Chancellor. ' ' 25 In
theory, the latter course was chosen, 2 but in practice the fact
that the instance common law judge saw and heard witnesses
inevitably modified the theory. Even though the oral evidence
was available to the appellate tribunal in the form of the
judge's, and later the official shorthand, notes of the trial, the
appellate courts deferred to the trial courts on matters of
credibility and demeanor, and thus to a considerable extent on
questions of perception, of primary fact. But there has not been
any hesitancy on the part of the appellate courts to overturn a
trial court on a question involving the drawing of an inference
from the observable data. The rules of the Supreme Court read
in part: "The Court of Appeal shall have power to draw in-
ferences of fact and give any judgment and make any order
which ought to have been made. '2 7
Thus, with regard to issues of primary fact, the trial judge
is in much the same invulnerable position as a jury. But as to
matters of inference, of conclusions based upon the primary
facts, his findings are much more vulnerable than would be
those of a jury.28 A jury verdict consists in a few words which
25, DEvLIiN, TRIAL BY JuRy 132, 138 (Hamlyn Lecture, 8th series, 1956).
26. The Rules of Court stated that "all appeals to the Court of Appeal shall
be by way of rehearing."
27. Ord. 58, r. 4.
28. The traditional interpretation of the extent of the Court of Appeal's
powers of review of trial judges was a stated by Viscount Cove, L.C., in Mersey
Docks and Harbour Board v. Procter [1923] A.C. 253, 258: "The procedure on an
appeal from a judge sitting without a jury is not governed by the rules applicable
to a motion for a new trial upon a verdict of a jury. In such a case it is the
duty of the Court of Appeal to make up its own mind, not disregarding the judg-
ment appealed from and giving special weight to that judgment in cases when the
credibility of witnesses comes into question, but with full liberty to draw its own
inference from the facts proved or admitted to and decide accordingly." Notwith-
standing the clarity of this language, it has not always been fully settled that
the trial judge's inferences are fully reviewable. Despite the wording of the
appropriate rules of court to the effect that appeals are 'by way of rehearing,
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dispose of issues of primary :and secondary fact alike. As to
issues of primary fact-frequently involving credibility ques-
tions-the jury is at its best; perhaps it is superior to a trial
judge in this respect.2 1 But on questions of secondary fact, in-
volving the deriving of inference, the trial judge ought to be a
superior tribunal to the jury. "It is curious, therefore, that the
alternative mode of trial [trial by judge alone, with thorough
appellate review of secondary facts] should select as the focal
point for review that part of the trial judge's work at which
he is at his best as compared with the jury, and treat his finding
on primary facts as having almost the same untouchability as
that of a jury. But that it should be so is dictated by the fact
that both modes are modes of oral trial; whoever hears the
witnesses, whether it be judge or jury, must be conceded the ad-
vantage. The point, however, emphasizes what is lost by giving
to the jury a supremacy over the secondary facts which the
trial judge, in this matter their superior in assessment, is
denied; and it illustrates too what is lacking in the alternative
mode. No way has been found of gaining the superiority of a
jury as judges of the primary facts without being saddled with
their inferiority as judges of the secondary." 30
and that the Court of Appeal has full power to draw its own inferences, a number
of dicta in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in recent years
seemed to suggest that the decision of a trial judge should be "equivalent to a
verdict of a jury on a question of fact." See Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850-62.
The conflict between this view and the view expressed 'by Viscount Cove in the
Mersey Docks case was reconciled in favor of the latter by the House of Lords
in Benmax v. Austin Motor Co., [19551 2 W.L.R. 418. In that case the trial
judge decided that appellant's letters patent were valid, basing this conclusion
upon a finding of fact that the invention in question was new. In the House of
Lords, appellant argued that the Court of Appeal should have regarded itself
as bound by the trial court's findings of fact, but the Lords concluded that no
such limitation exists. Viscount Simonds said that "some confusion may have
arisen from the failure to distinguish between the finding of a specific fact and
finding of fact which is really an inference from facts specifically found, or, as
it has sometimes been said, between the perception and evaluation of facts." Id.
at 420. On questions of inference, the Court of Appeal is in as good position as the
trial judge to reach conclusions. It ought to give weight to his opinion, but cannot
shirk the responsibility of re-examining his inferences.
29. See DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 132, 140 (Hamlyn Lecture, 8th series, 1956).
30. Id. at 141. Appellate treatment of quantum findings illustrates the dif-
ference between judge and jury inferences. The traditional formulations of the
tests for review sound much alike. It is said that the Court of Appeal will not
interfere with a jury's assessment of damages unless it is "out of all proportion
to the circumstances of the case." Where a judge has determined quantum, his
finding will 'be disturbed "only if it is a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage
suffered." The two formulations, however, mean very different things in practice.
Appellate courts seek to keep judicial awards uniform, whereas jury awards are
generally treated as inviolate. One reason for the difference in treatment is the
fact that jury actions in general have no effect on future cases-one of the
strengths of the jury. Another is the fact that it is impossible to tell what
factors a jury verdict has been based upon. Despite these considerations, how-
ever, the Court of Appeal in Ward v. James, [1965] 1 All E.R. 563, indicated
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B. Louisiana
Enough has been said to indicate that in Louisiana appellate
fact review and civil non-jury trial are interwoven facts of a
legal system. One facet feeds the other. If appellate courts freely
review facts, juries are employed sparingly. If juries are not
employed, there will likely be less respect for findings of fact
on appeal. Substantive effects ensue. In light of this, it is im-
portant to note that in theory the Louisiana appellate courts
review facts with something less than complete fullness and
freedom. Rather than always substituting their judgment for
that of the trial court on a factual question, the appellate courts
have consistently said that they will overturn a factual deter-
mination only if it is "manifestly erroneous."3 1 It is possible to
disagree about how much less than complete freedom of review
is effected, and about how much it ought to be, 32 but it seems
clear that the manifest error doctrine is some kind of a limita-
tion. The stated rule of the jurisprudence is that the manifest
error standards control fact review whether the trier has been
judge or jury.3 3 The manifest error rule is quite flexible, and it
might be supposed that its application would vary, perhaps
limiting the extent of review more closely in jury than in judge-
tried cases. But to the extent that the jurisprudence indicates
that the scope of review might be different for jury-found fac-
tual determinations, it suggests that jury findings of fact are
at least as readily overturned as are judge-tried facts.3 4
That appellate review can be quite extensive on questions of
perception or primary fact, as well as on questions of inference,
is illustrated by Brown v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co.33 In an ac-
that, in future, the Court of Appeal will be much less reluctant to repair jury
errors on questions of quantum. It is all very well to allow a jury finding to
stand when the considerations upon which it was based are not known and when
there is reason to suppose that the jury is aware of the more important considera-
tions. But as to quantum, it is known that juries are ignorant of the most crucial
factor-the conventional figure for the type of injury in question.
31. See Robertson, Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 21
LA. L. Rav. 402 (1961).
32. For divergent views of two appellate judges on this question see Tate,
Further Observations on Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases,
22 LA. L. REv. 605 (1962) ; Hardy, The Manifest Error Rule, 21 LA&. L. REV. 749
(1962).
33. See Gilliand v. Feibleman's Inc., 161 La. 24, 28, 108 So. 112, 113 (1926);
Burt v. Burt, 160 La. 387, 107 So. 234 (1926) ; Moret v. New Orleans Rys.,
112 La. 863, 36 So. 759 (1904) ; Klein v. Dinkgrave, 4 La. Ann. 540 (1849) ;
Boissier's Syndics v. Belaire, 3 Mart.(NS.) 29 (La. 1824) ; Roux v. Attardo,
93 So.2d 332 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
34. See McGinn v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 118 La. 811, 43 So. 450
(1907).
35. 147 La. 829, 86 So. 281 (1920).
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tion for damages for the death of a two-year-old child struck
by a train, the Supreme Court overturned the verdict of a jury
in plaintiff's behalf despite the fact that the governing issue
was purely factual:
"The question of liability of the defendant depends entirely
upon the question of fact whether the time and distance were
sufficient for the engineer to stop his train and prevent the
accident when the child appeared upon the track and within
view of the engineer." 3"
There is some inference-drawing to be done in resolving such a
question, but it would seem to turn primarily on perceptions, and
one would think such matters peculiarly suitable for jury de-
termination. Yet the jury's decision was overturned:
"The verdict of the jury in this case is not altogether per-
suasive, by reason of the meagerness of the amount of com-
pensation allowed for the loss and suffering endured by the
plaintiffs. The allowance of only $900 as compensation for
the loss and suffering endured by the parents suggests very
strongly that the jurors themselves were doubtful whether
any compensation should be allowed. '37
The stated grounds for reversing a jury finding based mainly
on questions of primary fact is unpersuasive.3 8 Trial courts exist,
and there must be reasons for them. Any traditional list of
reasons would include the exercise of primary responsibility for
making findings as to what happened. The trial court sees and
hears the witnesses and is generally closer to the ground.3 9 If
a jury and trial judge cannot be trusted to make a decision
depending "entirely upon the question of fact whether the time
and distance were sufficient for the engineer to stop his train
and prevent the accident, 4 it is difficult to see what purposes
they could serve.
IV. APPELLATE FACT CONCLUSIONS AS PRECEDENT
A. England
The modern English resolution of the question of the extent
36. Id. at 830, 86 So. at 281.
37. Id. at 833, 86 So. at 281.
38. The record reveals that plaintiffs were Negroes. The Supreme Court
opinion does not advert to that fact, but the jury may be presumed to have been
aware of it.
39. When the trial judge visits the scene of the accident, his perceptions and
inferences are accorded great weight. See Lehon v. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc., 123 So. 172 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
40. See note 37 supra.
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of appellate fact review has been lauded as "highly satisfac-
tory."' 41 But attention has also been directed to the "possibly un-
desirable consequences of the decision. '42 It has been realized
that "encouraging Courts of Appeal to review a trial judge's
evaluation of facts" has enhanced the risk that "the evaluation
of facts will be treated as a binding decision of law for the
future."43
An aspect of the specter of a multiplicity of common sense
propositions of fact becoming elevated to the status of precedent
was raised and attempted to be laid in Qualcast (Wolverhamp-
ton) Ltd. v. Haynes.44 While handling a ladle of molten metal,
plaintiff, an experienced foundry worker, was injured when the
ladle slipped, splashing the metal on to his foot. He was not
wearing protective spats-which would have prevented the in-
jury-although he knew that his employers kept a stock of
them available for the asking. He had not been ordered or ad-
vised to wear them. The county court judge considered that
plaintiff was sufficiently experienced that no warning was
necessary. But he felt himself bound by authority to decide other-
wise: "Now, if I were not bound by authority I should decide
that the plaintiff was so experienced that he needed no warning
and that what he did was with the full knowledge of the risks
involved, and that there was no negligence on the part of the
defendants. But I feel in view of the authority cited to me that
such a decision would be wrong and I feel compelled to come to
a different conclusion."
. The Court of Appeal sustained the county court judgment. 4 5
All three of the judges-Evershed, M.R., Parker, L.C.J., and
Sellers, L.J.-based their judgments primarily on the theory that
the trial court's conclusion as to defendant's culpable negligence
was "in the end a conclusion of fact. '46 As such, they were un-
willing to review it.
On appeal to the House of Lords held, reversed. The appeal
should have been allowed. As to the Court of Appeal's reluctance
to review the county court's inference of fact-secondary fact-
that defendant's negligence was responsible for the injury-Lord
Denning was especially critical. "By the time the case reached
41. Goodhart, Appeals on Questions of Fact, 1955 L.Q. Rev. 402.
42. James, Report of Panel Discussion on Torts, 1960 J. Soc. PuB.
TAc. ERs L. 212, 213.
43. Id.
44. [1959] A.C. 743, 754.
45. Haynes v. Qualcast (Wolverhampton), Ltd., [1958] 1 All E.R. 441.
46. Id. at 445.
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the Court of Appeal, the primary facts were all ascertained, and
the only issue was what was the proper conclusion from these
facts." 47 On a question of secondary fact, the Court of Appeal
should reverse the judge if convinced he was wrong. Besides, the
Court of Appeal erred in regarding the county court's conclu-
sion that he was bound by the authorities to find negligence as
a question of fact. "The judge's conclusion is not a conclusion of
fact but a conclusion of law reached on an erroneous assumption
that he was bound by a series of inapplicable authorities. '4
Several of the Lords had cogent observations to make about
the county court's view that the authorities bound him to find,
against his better judgment, that the defendant had been negli-
gent. Lord Keith stated: "The learned judge has misdirected
himself. The cases referred to... differed in material respects
from the facts of the present case. In the sphere of negligence
where circumstances are so infinite in their variety it is rarely,
if ever, that one case can be a binding authority for another. ' 4 1
Lord Somervell said that errors like that of the county court
judge were but part of
"[T] he effect on the precedent system of the virtual abolition
of juries in negligence actions.... [A] jury's decision did
not become part of our law citable as precedent.... Now that
negligence cases are mostly tried without juries, the distinc-
tion between the functions of judge and jury is blurred. A
judge naturally gives reasons for the conclusion formerly
arrived at by a jury without reasons. It may sometimes be
difficult to draw the line, but if the reasons given by a judge
for arriving at the conclusion previously reached by a jury
are to be treated as 'law' and citable, the precedent system
will die from a surfeit of authorities.... I have come to the
conclusion that the learned judge's first impulse was the right
conclusion on the facts as he found them and for the reason
which he gives. I will not elaborate these reasons or someone
might cite my observations as part of the law of negligence. ' ' 5°
47. Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, [1959] A.C. 743, 761.
48. Id. at 755.
49. Id.
50. Id. at757. Lord Denning's observations were in similar vein. lie said
that the question of what reasonable care demanded of this employer in these
circumstances was clearly a question of fact. The solution of this question may
be assisted by taking into account "any proposition of good sense that is relevant
in the circumstances." But these propositions of good sense must not he treated
as propositions of law. In a case like the present, the employer "ought, I should
have thought, to provide protective footwear. But in saying so I speak as a
juryman. I should have thought that the employer ought to advise and encourage
the man to wear protective footwear. But again I speak as juryman and not as
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The Qualcast case constituted a vigorous attempt by the
House of Lords to take prophylactic action against the "surfeit
of authority" that will result from continued and increased treat-
ment of proposition of fact as citable. That the attempt was not
completely successful is indicative of the complexity and dif-
ficulty .of the problem. The observation of Lords, Keith, Somer-
vell, and Denning, are all framed in terms of the danger of
elevating propositions of fact, of good sense, into propositions of
law. All are cognizant of the fact that the line between law and
fact may be exceedingly difficult to draw. At the same time,
the Lords seem to succumb to the tendency to regard the law-
fact distinction as qualitative, and as sufficiently rigid to permit
making the determination of whether a particular proposition is
citable on the basis of which category it falls into. Probably
the reverse formulation is more helpful. It is not very useful to
say that "proposition X is a proposition of law, and therefore
is citable as authority." The division between "law" and "fact"
was originally drawn when there was a jury in the cases decided
at the instance level. The substance of the distinction turned
upon the procedure, in the sense that questions left for decision
by a jury were regarded as questions of fact; other questions
were treated as questions of law. The fact of the matter is that
removal of the jury has taken much of the substance out of the
law-fact distinction. A purposive classification is therefore en-
tirely fitting and proper.
a judge." (Id. at 761.) The county court's mistake was by no mean inexplicable:
"He was presented with a number of cases in which judges on the high court
had given reasons for coming to their conclusions of fact. And those reasons
seemed to him to be so expressed as to be rulings in points of law. This is
not the first time this sort of thing has happened. Take accidents on the
road. In several cases Scrutton, L.J. said that 'if a person rides in the dark
he must ride at such a pace that he can pull up within the limits of his
vision.' That was treated as a proposition of law until the Court of Appeal
firmly ruled that it was not. So also with accidents in factories. I myself once
said that an employer, by his foreman must 'do his best to keep [the men]
up to the mark'. Someone shortly afterward sought to treat me as having
laid down a new proposition of law, but the Court of Appeal corrected the
error. Such cases all serve to bear out the warning which has been given
in this House before: 'We ought to beware of allowing tests or guides which
have -been suggested by the court in one, set of circumstances to be applied
to other surroundings' and this by degree to turn that which is it bottom a
question of fact into a proposition of law. That is what has happened in the
cases under the Workman's Compensation Act, and it led to a 'wagonload
of cases'. Let not the same thing happen to the common law, lest.we be
crushed under the weight of our own reports." (Id. at 771.)
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B. Louisiana
Theoretically the civilian tradition involves, along with ap-
pellate fact review, the absence of the principle of stare decisis.
It is relatively easy to find in the Louisiana jurisprudence state-
ments to the following effect: "Our common-law brothers have
the rule of stare decisis. Such does not prevail in Louisiana.
Each case must stand or fall on its own facts."'
Such statements are not to be taken at face value, frequently
not even within the context of the case where made. Consider,
for example, McKellar v. Mason.5 2 The 64-year-old Mason shot
plaintiff with a twenty-gauge shotgun as plaintiff, a 14-year-old
boy, was leaving Mason's yard after an unsuccessful attempt
to steal pigeons. The decision turned on whether Mason's conduct
was reasonable in the circumstances. An important considera-
tion was Mason's testimony that he fired out of fear for his and
his wife's safety, rather than in order to protect his property.
The appellate court had substantial doubts about the complete
truthfulness of Mason's testimony about his motivation, im-
plying that Mason, and the defendants in four similar cases,
"have been the beneficiaries of excellent legal advice prior to
making any admissions which could be construed to be pre-
judicial."53 Nevertheless, the court of appeal agreed with the
trial court in resolving those doubts in defendant's favor. The
major persuasive factor was the four similar decisions, all of
which had gone for defendant. It is true, said the court, that "in
determining what is reasonable conduct there is no fixed rule. ' '15
That is true because "there are principally standards and de-
grees of negligence for the reason that no judge is so gifted with
foresight that he can anticipate every possible factual event
and prescribe the proper rule for each."55 This truth is reinforced
by the fact that "the doctrine of stare decisis, that is, the case
being the philosophical key to the solution of all problems, has
no application in Louisiana.' ' 56 Notwithstanding all that, how-
51. Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231, 248, 69 So.2d 26, 32 (1953). The quoted state-
ment derives added force from having been made in response to a contention that
refusal to follow an earlier decision would upset a rule of property law. See also
McKellar v. Mason, 159 So.2d 700, 703 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
52. 159 So.2d 700 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
53. Id. at 704.
54. 1d. at 703.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 704.
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ever, and notwithstanding the recognition that "the facts in
this case are somewhat less favorable to the defendant than in
the [four] cited cases"5 7 the court of appeal ended up following
them, stating: "It is only a matter of degree, and the legal prin-
ciples involved are nonetheless the same.
' '
51
In a thorough-going civilian system, without stare decisis,
appellate pronouncements on fact questions would no more be-
come binding than would other appellate pronouncements, so
that the problem treated by the House of Lords in the Qualcast59
case could hardly arise. But in point of fact, Louisiana has in all
significant respects aligned herself with the common law tradi-
tion respecting the effect of precedent. 60 While there has been
scant discussion of the subject in the Louisiana legal literature,
study of the jurisprudence reveals that the Qualcast problem
has arisen here. Appellate rulings on fact questions do get treated
as precedent. Particularly in the field of negligence there has
developed an extensive body of case law stating that certain sets
of primary fact will lead to certain inferences of secondary
fact; many of these conclusions would be unreviewable jury de-
terminations-propositions of common sense-in other jurisdic-
tions.61 If there is danger that the American system of juris-
prudence is slowly sinking under a "surfeit of authorities,"
then surely it would be alarming to discover that the Louisiana
jurisprudence is more cluttered than most.
SELECTED NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS
Once the primary facts are determined, their characteriza-
tion-negligence, or reasonable care-is a mixed question,
neither purely legal nor purely factual. Not surprisingly, the
Louisiana appellate courts have differed in their assessments of
the nature of that question. In a railway crossing collision case,
the First Circuit Court of Appeal stated: "It is fundamental that
the question of negligence... is purely a question of fact to be
57. Id. at 703.
58. Id.
59. Discussed note 44 supra.
60. See Comment, 7 TuL. L. REv. 100 (1932) ; McKellar v. Mason, 159 So.2d
700 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
61. See, e.g., the following California decisions all expressing deference to
jury determinations: Pfingsten v. Westenhaver, 39 Cal. 2d 395 244 P.2d 395
(1952) ; Howard v. Bartolotti, 302 P.2d 36 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1956) ; Wright
v. Vaughn, 294 P.2d 951 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1956); Bady v. Detwiler, 273
P.2d 941 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1954) ; Thomas v. Laguna, 248 P.2d 929 (Cal. App.
2d Dist. 1952).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
determined in the light of the circumstances of each individual
case."6 2 The context in which that statement occurred made
clear that the court was talking about characterizing established
facts, not about finding primary facts. That puts the statement
in diametric opposition to the Louisiana Supreme Court's de-
claration that "whether certain omissions or commissions, in a
given state of facts, constitute negligence is a question of law. '6 3
Neither statement was made lightly. The Supreme Court's as-
sertion that the characterization of particular conduct as negli-
gence vel non is a question of law14 was made in a decision re-
versing the trial court and the court of appeal on that issue.65
The First Circuit statement that the question of negligence is
factual was made in order to meet defendant's citation of a line
of cases that seemed to say that failure to stop, look, and listen
at a railway crossing is contributory negligence; the court stated
that those cases were acceptably decided in the light of their in-
dividual circumstances, but that the negligence question is
"purely" factual. 8
Disagreement among the appellate courts on the nature of
the negligence question would not matter so much if the follow-
ing statement, which seems to appear in virtually identical form
62. McFarland v. Illinois Central R.R., 112 So.2d 845, 853 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1960).
63. Llorens v. McCann, 187 La. 642, 647, 175 So. 442, 444 (1937).
64. The court may have hedged slightly in other language. First admitting
that it was never intended that writs of review should issue "in cases presenting
only questions of fact," Chief Justice O'Niell went on to point out that "our
finding of the facts of this case is in harmony with that of the district court and
of the Court of Appeal. When we speak of the facts of the case, we mean the
facts that were proved or admitted, not the deductions or conclusions as to whether
the truck driver and his helper were negligent."
65. The court based its conclusion that defendants' employees had been
negligent on the analogy of four cases establishing "the rule [that] the duty
that automobile drivers owe to children in the streets is very strict." Id. at 657,
175 So. at 447.
66. McFarland v. Illinois Central R.R., 112 So.2d 845, 853 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1960). But having said that, the court proceeded to consider American
Jurisprudence, C.J.S., and seven cases (which in turn considered eleven cases)
in support of its conclusion that the crossing in question amounted to a "dangerous
trap." That decisions on these "pure" questions of fact do tend to become precedent
is shown by the treatment accorded the McFarland decision in a later First Circuit
railway crossing case, Gray v. Illinois Central R.R., 132 So.2d 61 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961). There plaintiff's car was not hit by the engine of the train; he ran
into the twenty-first car. The court adverted to the McFarland statement that
negligence has to be determined on the particular facts of each case, spent several
paragraphs distinguishing McFarland on the facts, concluding with the statement:
"Learned counsel for plaintiff has cited no case or authority in which the dan-
gerous trap doctrine has been applied to a situation wherein a motorist collided
with a train under circumstances similar to those in the case at bar." 132 So.2d
at 64.
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in many Louisiana negligence decisions, could be taken at face
value:
"In determining what is negligent conduct, we have remarked
on several occasions that there is no fixed rule; the facts and
environmental characteristics of each case must be considered
and treated individually in conformity with the true civil
law concept. Judicially we are tending more and more towards
an appreciation of the truth that, in the last analysis, there
are few absolute rules of negligence; there are principally
standards and degrees of negligence for the reason that no
one is so gifted with foresight that he or she could anticipate
every possible human event and prescribe the proper rule for
each.' 6 7
Despite the reference to "the true civil law concept," the quoted
language is a cogent statement of the philosophy of common law
negligence. It explains why the question of what a reasonable
man would have done under the circumstances is traditionally a
jury question. In Louisiana, the statement does not mean what
it seems to say. Whether a judge or jury has found the fact of
negligence, the determination is freely reviewable. More im-
portantly, the appellate courts will sometimes assess the cor-
rectness of the instant tribunal's determination on that question
in terms of pronouncements in other appellate decisions. In the
very case from which the above quotation was taken, the actual
disposition of the case was made on the basis of a rule of "law"
that trains need not slow down in the fog6s Why that kind of
prescriptions. The appellate courts of Louisiana resist the rigors
rule of law would appeal to a judge who realized that the negli-
gence inquiry is supposed to be highly particularized is dif-
ficult to comprehend.69
67. American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 111 So.2d 380, 383
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1959). See also McKeller v. Mason, 159 So.2d 700, 703 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Fiegler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 90 So.2d 877, 879 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1956).
68. "The law applicable to the facts are revealed herein and is found 'by the
trial court appears to be well settled. The courts have recognized that fog and
rain prevent a locomotive's operators from having good visibility of the tracks
ahead, the same is the existence of a curve; and judges have rationalized on in-
numerable occasions that a railroad company is not required to slow its train
during rain or foggy weather. [citing three cases]." (Emphasis added.) American
Employers Ins. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 11 So.2d 380, 382 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1959).69. A similar discrepancy 'between the court's statements as to the effects of
precedent and the actual resolution of the case in which the statement was made
is seen in Peltier v. Thibodaux, 175 La. 1026, 144 So. 903 (1932), wherein the
question was the appropriate sum for attorney's fees. The Supreme Court said
that "while precedent would be followed if any existed, the decisions really set
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Automobile cases have provided a particularly fertile ground
for the creation of narrow and specific precedents. A fascinating
complex of decisions revolve around the question of liability
when, at night or under circumstances of reduced visibility, a
moving vehicle collides with a stationary vehicle. In these cases,
negligence, traditionally a broad and flexible concept permitting
appropriate recognition of the unique circumstances of each case,
has become a compendium of specific and relatively inflexible
of this crystallization by indulging in a variety of skillful tech-
niques for avoiding outcomes seen as unjust, but the result is
frequently less than elegant. At issue in Ardoin v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.7 0 for example, was a collision between a
12,000 pound gasoline tank truck driven by Elwood Reed and a
stationary gravel truck that Marion Hoffpauir had parked partly
on the highway while changing a flat tire. The court of appeal
and the trial court agreed that Hoffpauir had been negligent,
but differed about Reed. The reasoning of the appellate court
was unnecessarily tortured. The factual conclusion that Reed
had been guilty of contributory negligence could have been
supported in the following way, without more:
"The fact that plaintiff's truck was being driven with a heavy
load at a speed of 35 or 40 miles per hour, that visibility was
extremely limited because of a dense fog, and that the driver
of plaintiff's truck saw the Hoffpauir vehicle in ample time
to stop but did not do so, convinces us that Reed was negli-
gent, either in operating his truck at an excessive rate of
speed under the existing atmospheric conditions or in failing
to bring his truck under control after observing an obstacle
in the road ahead of him.
''7 1
This statement, standing alone, would have been entirely sup-
portable as an exercise of the appellate court's constitutional
duty of reviewing the facts found by the trial court. But in addi-
tion, the court of appeal: (1) Cited ten and quoted from six
cases in support of the proposition that it is negligent to drive
no precedent in case of this kind." Id. at 1030, 144 So. at 904. After making that
statement, the court cited previous cases to the effect that lawyers' fees in suc-
cession matters range from two to five percent, and upheld the trial court's award
in the instant case, which was about 2 1/4 percent.
70. 133 So.2d 129 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
71. Id. at 133.
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in excess of the speed at which the vehicle can be stopped within
the limits of visibility. (2) Distinguished two cases exonerating
drivers who had struck stationary vehicles at night on the theory
that in those cases the stationary vehicles were on curves and
thus not illuminable by the approaching headlights. (3) Granted
a rehearing, in the course of which two more cases were adduced
in support of the proposition that it is unreasonable to travel
at excessive speeds under conditions of reduced visibility.
The spectacle of a court straining for precedent for the pro-
position that unreasonable speed is unreasonable is unedifying."
Another of the cases in the same line of jurisprudence involved
in Ardoin is equally illustrative of the problem. In Vowell v.
Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co.,73 the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated:
"Our rule that a motorist traveling on the public highway
after dark or during other abnormal condition which prevents
him seeing ahead, except imperfectly, and for a short time and
distance, must guard against striking objects in the road
with which he may be suddenly confronted, constitutes an
exception to the general rule that a motorist may assume that
the road is safe for travel even at night. But that exception
to the general rule is itself subject to the exception that
a motorist traveling by night is not charged with the duty
of guarding against striking an unexpected or unusual ob-
struction, which he had no reason to anticipate he would en-
counter on the highway. ' '7 4
The quoted language can be paraphrased as follows: General
rule: Even at night, a motorist may assume (i.e., it is not unrea-
sonable in assuming) that the road is safe for travel. Exception:
Even so, he must (i.e., will be unreasonable if he does not) look
out for objects with which he may suddenly be confronted. Ex-
ception to exception: But he need not look out for objects that
72. Cf. Tucker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 160 So.2d 440, 442 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1964), wherein 8 cases, LA. Civ. ConE art. 2315, and a passage from C.J.S. were
in effect cited in support of the proposition that negligence is the absence of
reasonable care, and an additional case was cited for the proposition that "a
defendant cannot be required to guard against an event which could not reasonably
have been anticipated by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence."
73. 229 La. 798, 86 So.2d 909 (1956).
74. Id. at 808, 86 So.2d at 913.
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he has no reason to anticipate. Upshot: A motorist at night
must look out for sudden confrontations with objects that he has
reason to anticipate. Fairly obviously, all that has been asserted
is that the reasonable man foresees certain dangers, others he
does not. Which ones are foreseeable is a question that has to be
answered by common sense, on the basis of the circumstances in
each case. It cannot be nailed down by specific rules, no matter
how detailed. The volume of litigation that has resulted from the
relatively common-place occurrence of low-visibility collision
between moving vehicle and stationary object 75 is eloquent testi-
monial to the futility of the attempt to create a case-law code
that answers all the questions.76 Whether the appellate courts
behave as though they believe it, their statement is true; in the
last analysis, there are few absolute rules of negligence. 77
V. CONCLUSION
The House of Lords' effort in Qualcast to guard against the
undue multiplication of narrow and specific rules of decisional
law may not prove to be entirely successful, but explicit judicial
attention to the problem is a healthy example. The Louisiana
appellate courts have been skillful in working within the frame-
work of an unnecessarily crystallized system of negligence law
to achieve justice in the individual case. But the rigorous think-
ing and acuteness of judicial technique demanded by the task
ofcoping with too many precedents could be more beneficially
employed. To the extent that attention must be focused on
manipulation of the precedents it is inevitably diverted from
other considerations. The essential learning of the American
leal realist tradition is that the same precision and rigor that
operation within a mechanistic jurisprudence demanded can and
should be employed in identifying, isolating, and weighing the
policy issues presented by appellate cases. Civilian Louisiana,
with its potential freedom from the narrow and technical stare
decisis of the common law, could well become the United States'
75. In addition to Ardoin and Vowell, and cases therein cited, see Carona v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 164 So.2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964),
reversing trial court, Ramsey v. Langston, 140 So.2d 775 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).76. See also the following line of intersectional collision cases: Kientz v.
Charles Dennory, Inc., 209 La. 144, 24 So.2d 292 (1945) ; Lampkin v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 99 So.2d 147 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957); Fugetta v.
Loubat, 97 So.2d 96 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Bartholomaus v. H. G. Hill
Stores, 97 So.2d 82 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
77. See quotation from the American Employers case, note 67 supra.
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leading refutation of Jonathan Swift: "It is a maxim among
these lawyers that whatever has been done before may legally
be done again; and therefore they take special care to record all
the decisions formerly made against common justice and the
general reason of makind. These, under the name of precedents,
they produce as authorities."
